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Abstract: 
Recognising that many of the modern categories with which we think about 
people and their activities were put in place through the use of numbers, 
we ask how numbering practices compose contemporary sociality. Focusing 
on particular forms of algorithmic personalisation, we describe a pathway 
of a-typical individuation in which repeated and recursive tracking is used 
to create partial orders in which individuals are always more and less than 
one. Algorithmic personalisation describes a mode of numbering that 
involves forms of de- and re- aggregating, in which a variety of contexts 
are continually included and excluded. This pathway of a-typical 
individuation is important, we suggest, to a variety of domains and, more 
broadly, to an understanding of contemporary economies of sharing where 
the politics of collectivities, ownership and use are being reconfigured as a 
default social.  
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Algorithmic personalisation as a mode of individuation 1 
‘The less the determinism, the more the possibilities for constraint.’ (Hacking 1991: 194).  
 
Introduction 
This is the age of personalisation. Personalising practices permeate everyday life in the UK - we are 
invited to participate in personalised medical, health and care services, to benefit from personalised 
customer experiences, to find our way with personalised maps, acquire a personalised education, 
keep up-to-date with personalised news, get a bargain with personalised prices and so on. To give 
some more concrete examples: in 2007 the UK Government published Putting People First: A shared 
vision and commitment to finding new ways to improve social care in England 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/dr_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/
dh_081119.pdf). The paper outlined the government’s intention to transform adult social care so 
‘that every person who receives support, whether provided by statutory services or funded by 
themselves, will have choice and control over the shape of that support in all care settings’. This 
‘vision’ describes itself as a totally different approach to an historic ‘one size fits all’ system. With an 
initial focus on transforming social care and support services, the paper proposes that principles of 
personalisation be embedded in a range of other service areas such as health and education. An 
example from the field of health and well-being is PatientsLikeMe, a website 
(http://www.patientslikeme.com) that combines features of traditional qualitative on-line patient 
communities with quantitative data-collection; the (trade-marked) strap-line is ‘Live better, 
together!’. This website has 300,000 members, who ‘share’ over 23,000 diseases, and have 
contributed over 25 million data points about their diseases, resulting in over 50 published research 
studies. The website says, 
By sharing health data on PatientsLikeMe, people not only help themselves, but help others 
who can learn from their experiences, and advance research. … Learn from others, connect 
with people like you, track your health. 
The platform is also described as a tool that helps patients find a ‘just-in-time’, ‘someone-like-me’ 
peer who can be relied upon to compare options and aid decision-making. A final example of 
personalisation is the recommendation service Stitch Fix (https://www.stitchfix.com), a website that 
describes itself as ‘Your partner in style’ and which seeks to recommend clothing for women on a 
personal basis. The business proposition is that the recommendation service - a composite of 
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algorithmic and human reasoning - knows better than the customer herself what clothes she will 
like: selected items of clothing are sent directly to her, without a preview, as otherwise her 
prejudices might prevent her from choosing items that she, unknowingly, will really like.   
The question this paper seeks to address is: what kind of individuation (Simondon 1992; Foucault 
2001) is personalisation? We ask this question in order to explore the implications of personalisation 
for how we live together, that is, for forms of sociality. We start from the assumption that 
personalisation is not only personal: it is never about only one person, just me or just you, but 
always involves generalisation. Indeed, our argument will be that it is a mode of individuation in 
which entities are precisely specified by way of recursive inclusion in types or classes as part of the 
making of what we describe as an a-typical pathway. To make this argument, we explore the use of 
recommendation algorithms to sort or classify people, analysing the way in which individuals are 
addressed as ‘a you’, while their membership of types or classes of person is perpetually revised. 
Our conclusion is that the familiar recognition that personalisation seems to provide – knowing you 
better than you yourself do - should not be considered as merely a more precise form of 
individuation. To the contrary, personalisation also constrains who and how we can be.  
Recognising that many of the modern categories with which we think about people and their 
activities were put in place through the use of numbers (Hacking 1991), we develop our analysis of 
algorithmic personalisation by drawing on an understanding of number as composition (Day, Lury 
and Wakeford, 2014).  This approach starts from the assumption that numbering is everywhere 
(Hayles 2014), even though numbers may not always be visible. As such, it seeks to situate 
contemporary analyses of algorithms within the wider context of cultures of numbering. As (even) 
Badiou (2008) remarks, ‘A ‘cultural fact’ is a numerical fact. And, conversely, whatever produces 
number can be culturally located; that which has no number shall have no name either’ (Badiou 
2008: 2-3). In a similar vein, Totaro and Ninno (2014) also comment on the pervasiveness of 
numbering, but focus specifically on the performativity of the recursive function, which, they argue, 
provides ‘an interpretive key to modern rationality’: 
The notion that the ‘logic of numbers’ operates exclusively on numbers is misleading. In the 
second half of the last century, the theory of recursive functions has made it clear that the 
concept of calculation is very general and does not necessarily imply the manipulation of 
numerical symbols. (2014: 2) (See also Neyland 2014; Totaro and Ninno 2016.) 
Formatted: Highlight
Page 2 of 39Theory Culture & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
3 
 
More circumspectly, Heinz notes that ‘the observation and regulation of performances today has 
become mutual and reflexive, generalised and anonymous, and it is now increasingly based on 
observations and comparisons in terms of numbers’ (Heinz 2011: 22). 
Our compositional approach acknowledges the pervasiveness of numbering in contemporary society 
by looking at what numbering does, rather than what numbering is. Adopting a felicitous analogy 
from Verran, we think of numbers in the same way as anthropologists do kin: numbers both are and 
have relations just as people are and have relations (Verran 2010: 171; see also Urton 1997; 
Mackenzie 2014). In other words, we propose that it is as working relations that numbers are able to 
perform: to travel, to make possible comparison, conversion, and exchange, to be stored, to inform, 
and to make the same or different. By looking at how numbers are composed or formed in relations, 
and how social and cultural practices are formed (in part) by number, we aim to show how 
numbering is a re-presentation - in this case, of persons - that always holds more than one 
presentation.  
To understand how it is that we have become habituated to declaring, measuring and sharing our 
personal characteristics, behaviours and opinions in the UK in order to carry out mundane activities, 
we begin by situating our analysis in the context of what has been called a ‘like economy’ (Gerlitz 
and Helmond 2013). This context is important, we suggest, insofar as it makes relational value 
available for computational calculation.  Drawing on our compositional approach to numbering, we 
then develop a set of terms – tracking, bordering, folding and pausing – that lead us to describe 
forms of personalisation that are performed by recommendation algorithms as the making of a 
pathway of a-typical individuation. Critically, this pathway creates ‘a’ person or individual that is 
always provisional and corresponds only partially with the type or category in which it is included, 
whether this concerns what a person might buy, like, share or possess. The term pathway is 
intended to capture this category of person, a ‘category’ that is never static but always changing and 
always in motion. While our analytic focus is on the example of algorithmic personalisation, and in 
particular algorithmic personalisation that involves the use of collaborative filters, we also make 
references to other examples which share the same logic.   
 
Liking and likeness 
The rise of a ‘like economy’ begins, so Gerlitz and Helmond argue (2013), with the arrival of Google 
in the late 1990s. It is widely known that Google’s early success stemmed from its use of a search 
engine that shifted the value determination of websites from hits alone to hits and links. The 
Page 3 of 39 Theory Culture & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
4 
 
hyperlink analysis algorithm, PageRank, enabled calculation of the relative importance and ranking 
of a page within a larger set of pages, based on the number of in-links to the page and, recursively, 
the value of the pages linking to that page and so on. All links do not have equal value in this type of 
search engine, as links from authoritative sources or links from sources receiving many in-links are 
weighted in the algorithm.  
The use of weighted measures of linking was a first step towards inscribing the capacity to identify 
and intensify ‘relational value’ in search engine algorithms (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013; see also 
Feuz, Fuller and Stalder 2011). And it is this relational value, we propose, that is central to 
personalisation insofar as it makes relations between people available for computational calculation. 
Since this first step, the capacity to make relations of linking – or sharing - has been significantly 
extended as the determination of ‘authority’ has changed in line with the participatory features of 
Web 2.0. More web users now participate in making connections between websites through the 
creation and exchange of user-generated content (as well as gaming and the purchase of position). 
In particular, social buttons allow users to share, recommend, like or bookmark content, posts and 
pages across various social media platforms. In 2006, Facebook launched a share icon as a way for 
someone to share web content and invite re-sharing and then, in 2009, it introduced the Like button. 
In 2010, the company extended the capacities of the Like button to link by introducing an external 
Like button, a plugin that could be implemented by any webmaster, potentially rendering all web 
content like-able. Significantly, the external ‘Like’ button does not only capture actual likes, but also 
aggregates all activities performed on a web object: the number of likes and shares, further likes and 
comments on stories, and the number of inbox messages containing the object as an attachment. In 
another important development, Facebook’s Open Graph Protocol opened up their social graph – a 
representation of people and their connections – for external content, allowing for a controlled way 
of exchanging preformatted data between Facebook and the external web.  
It is through the use of these and other techniques, so Gerlitz and Helmond argue, that Facebook has 
been able to build a ‘like economy’, that is, an economy that builds on and exploits relational value, 
mediated by participation. They further suggest that this economy produces what, using Mark 
Zuckerberg’s own phrase, they call ‘the default social’. To this analysis we want to add the 
observation that the relations between the individual and the population that characterize this new 
social are both participatory and participative in that users may participate knowingly (participatory) 
or unknowingly (participative). Moreover, participation in the default social is mediated by 
techniques of exclusive inclusion and inclusive exclusion (Agamben 1998).2 On the one hand, the 
Open Graph is able to include non-users of Facebook as the external Like button cookie can trace 
non-users and add any information gained as anonymous data to the Facebook database and, on the 
Page 4 of 39Theory Culture & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
5 
 
other hand, a user’s explicitly invited activities may be excluded or rendered invisible to other users 
if they are not sufficiently highly ranked in the dimensions the graph provides. These oscillating 
dynamics - of being excluded in ways that inform the ordering of those included, and being included 
but not in ways that allow you to understand the terms of your membership - were intensified 
further in 2011 when Facebook expanded the possibilities of ‘invisible’ participation by proliferating 
custom actions:  
When creating an app, developers are prompted to define verbs that are shown as user 
actions and to specify the object on which these actions can be performed. Instead of being 
confined to ‘like’ external web content, users can now ‘read’, ‘watch’, ‘discuss’ or perform 
other actions. (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013: 1353)  
Gerlitz and Helmond conclude their analysis of the emergence of the like economy by suggesting 
that Facebook is being developed as an ‘infrastructure of decentralised data production and 
recentralised data processing’ (2013: 1357). While they do not discuss the role of recommendation 
systems within this infrastructure, these have become increasingly important operators of the de- 
and re-centralising practices of the economy Gerlitz and Helmond describe. Structured by the 
‘participatory’ practices of inclusive exclusion and exclusive inclusion, recommendation algorithms 
penetrate all corners of the Internet, making personalised recommendations - directly and indirectly 
- to individuals with interests in a variety of fields, including movies, music, news, books, research 
publications, restaurants, jokes, financial services, products of all sorts and persons (for example, in 
online dating).  It is to these algorithms that we now turn.  
 
Recommendation Algorithms 
While very many different kinds of algorithms are used in recommendation systems, two main kinds 
are distinguished, collaborative filtering algorithms and content sharing algorithms. Sometimes, as in 
Netflix, they are combined. The former group of algorithms is based on large amounts of digital data 
on users’ behavior, activities or preferences and leads to predictions of what users will like based on 
their similarity to others (see further below). An example is Last.fm (http://www.last.fm), a music 
‘station’ or streaming service that personalises the music it transmits by observing the music an 
individual has listened to on a regular basis and comparing those tracks with the listening behaviour 
of other individuals. The calculative process involved in this group of algorithms is sometimes 
described as ‘leveraging’ the behavior of users3 since it requires the participation of many users to 
produce personalised recommendations for one person.4 Content-based filtering methods, in 
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contrast, are based on a description of an item in terms of discrete characteristics; the algorithm is 
then designed to produce recommendations for individual users of items that have similar 
properties to those that the individual liked in the past (or is examining in the present).  Pandora 
Internet Radio (currently restricted to listeners in the USA, Australia and New Zealand because of 
licensing restrictions) is an example: it makes use of an algorithm that uses properties of a song or 
artists (a subset of the 450 attributes provided by the Music Genome Project) in order to seed a 
station to transmit personalised music.    
We focus on collaborative filtering algorithms, partly because their ability to make successful 
predictions across fields is held to be stronger than that of content based algorithms, but also 
because they require and exploit ‘participatory’ methods to develop novel classificatory techniques.  
As such, they allow us to identify distinctive aspects of personalisation as a mode of individuation. 
Crucially for the use of such algorithms, information relating to ‘pre-existing’ or demographic 
qualities of the person or entity concerned is not required to produce personalised 
recommendations. Instead the information required is produced through the aggregation of the 
ongoing participation of both the individual to whom the recommendations are made and other 
users of social media. Rather than allocating users to a pre-existing class, group or type (typically a 
socio-demographic stratum), the properties of which are presumed to be known in advance, the 
operations of collaborative filtering start from the premise that (individual) customers who share 
(that is, have in common) some preferences will also share others. This single but powerful 
assumption is of value for those developing algorithms in that ‘the only information [they need] to 
work is a set of numerical ratings — specific information about users or items to be recommended is 
not necessary’ (Seaver 2012).  
It is worth exploring how these numerical ratings are turned into personalised recommendations in 
some detail. A helpful analysis is provided by Seaver (2012), who describes the ‘signature action’ of 
collaborative filtering algorithms in terms of the operation of a grid, with items along one side, users 
along the other, and numerical ratings at their intersections (see also Bowker 2014; 
http;//personalisedcommunication.net/the-project/). Significantly, this grid is a matrix, that is, a grid 
with the formatted capacity to map (or perform) network transformations:  
This matrix is mostly empty (or “sparse”), since most users will have not rated most items. 
The work of the collaborative filtering algorithm … is to predict what values will show up in 
the empty spaces of the matrix. These predictions are then provided in some form to the 
user as recommendations. (Seaver 2012) 
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Seaver continues, ‘at any given time, the matrix is in an anticipatory flux: new ratings from users 
arrive constantly, displacing their predicted values and shifting the others. The calculative operations 
involved in this in-filling process is the signature action within the matrix — blank values are 
replaced by predictions, which are then replaced by actual ratings’.5 In the next stage described by 
Seaver, the numbers from the matrix are statistically analysed and their variance is mapped to a 
number of dimensions or axes.  Users who are ‘near’ each other on this multi-dimensional 
coordinate system are held to be similar (like each other), and a user will be recommended items 
from the neighbourhood around them. It is this calculative activity that leads to the paradigmatic 
claim of such algorithms to specify the individual in the complex conjugated personalised address: 
‘People like you like things like this’.  
But how, if at all, does this description of the calculative logic in recommendation algorithms help us 
understand what is distinctive about personalisation as a mode of individuation?  Seaver concludes 
that preference and similarity are collapsed in this calculative system since “liking” and “being like” 
are equated. We consider that an understanding of the composition of these relations will help us 
see how numbers are rendered consequential for the making up of persons (Hacking 1991). How is 
this equation accomplished or, in our terms, composed? If we are to address the specificity of 
personalisation as a mode of individuation we need to see the particular ways in which numbers 
both are and have relations.  
 
Pathways of a-typical individuation 
Seaver’s claim about the equivalence between liking and likeness in recommendation algorithms is 
less critical to our argument than his observation that this calculative matrix is in a constant state of 
anticipatory flux. Indeed, we propose that the emphasis on perpetual renewal means that the 
equation of ‘liking’ and ‘being like’ that is accomplished by these recommendation algorithms is not 
about establishing relations of absolute equivalence. Instead, we suggest, the calculative activity 
that produces the anticipatory flux of the matrix involves an ongoing series of approximations in 
which ‘being like’ and ‘liking’ are continually made more and less like each other in a variety of ways. 
Such approximations, we would emphasise, are designed to be subject to constant testing.  
As Seaver points out, such approximations vary hugely depending on the calculative space in which 
they are produced (3 or 9 axes or dimensions, for example). Their value - that is, their ability to 
produce personalised recommendations in terms of criteria of accuracy, diversity (of 
recommendations), privacy protection, and trust - is realised as they are tested repeatedly in 
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relation to data collected via a whole variety of participatory methods and metrics including those 
outlined above. In other words, the personalised address to ‘a you’ is not achieved through the 
collapse of liking and likeness, preference and similarity, but through a carefully calibrated 
sequencing of their possible inter-relationship.  Crucially, this process does not only involve the 
statistical making of proximity or nearness but also the turning of near-ness into next-ness, a process 
of bordering or adjoining. We conclude therefore that personalisation is not the collapse of liking 
and likeness but the making of a pathway, a dynamic series of approximations of similarity and 
preference that makes persons.  
Indeed, this pathway can be described as a mode of a-typical individuation. What do we mean, 
though, in our use of a-typical? Certainly it might seem counter-intuitive to use the term at all if it is 
understood to mean ‘not typical’ or ‘not of a type’, since we have argued throughout that 
personalisation is a mode of individuation that involves generalisation through the (repeated or 
recursive) inclusion of an entity in a type or class. While we propose that personalisation is a mode 
of inclusion that is not that of inclusion in a class or type defined by inherent or pre-given properties 
(using a-typical in a negative sense), we also want to use the term to describe a mode of recursive 
inclusion, in which both the individual and the type are repeatedly specified anew. To do so, we 
draw on multiple – etymologically unrelated – meanings of ‘a’. 
The first set of meanings are associated with the use of ‘a’ as the indefinite article, since this use 
directly indicates membership in a type or class of people, things or events (‘this is a cat’, ‘this is a 
friend of mine’). The indefiniteness of this inclusion, while appearing to indicate a lack of 
determination, has its own logic: for example, as well as meaning ‘one single’ or ‘any’, ‘a’ is also 
commonly used to introduce someone or something for the first time. It allows for a mode of 
inclusion in a type or category on the basis of criteria that are not pre-given but rather open to 
further (indefinite) specification (‘If that is what you think, then you are not a friend of mine because 
a friend of mine would not think that’). As the indefinite article, ‘a’ is also used to specify both 
someone or something as being like someone or something else (‘you are a star’) and to express 
rates or ratios, as in ‘for each’ or ‘per’.  Our use of the term a-typical thus calls up the operation of 
the two analytically distinct, but historically intertwined, understandings of analogy identified by 
Stafford (2001): participation (similitude, mimesis, likeness) and proportion (ratio).6  These are 
combined to produce principles of inclusion that are subject – recursively – to further revision: their 
combination is the means by which the you that is ‘a you’ becomes a recursive shifter (Chun 2011, 
2016). 
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To these meanings of ‘a’ as the indefinite article, we wish to add a further meaning, that is, ‘a’ as a 
variant spelling of ‘ad-‘, denoting motion or direction, a reduction or change into, an addition, 
increase or intensification, as in ‘adjoin’ or ‘adjacent’. The etymology of these terms relates to the 
Latin adjacentem, adjacens; from adjacere, ‘to lie at, to border upon, to lie near’; from ad-, "to" + 
jacere, "to lie, to rest"; literally, "to throw".  Our use of the term a-typical to describe pathways of 
individuation is thus intended to describe the ways in which collaborative filtering algorithms are 
designed to allow for the ongoing re-definition of principles of inclusion and exclusion via the 
recursive activity of adjoining or the work of adjacency: what we describe as the compositional 
practice of bordering or framing.7  In this practice, the aim is to create, not equivalence, but a 
topological invariance: that is, the aim is to achieve a continuity of a recursive function8 such that 
likeness (‘People like you’) is iteratively produced as a pathway through a massively aggregated de- 
and re-contexting of liking.  
How this is accomplished in the multi-dimensional calculative space of recommendation algorithms 
can be illustrated by way of a consideration of ‘the next adjacent possible’, a term developed by the 
theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman (2000).9 Put briefly, Kauffman understands life in terms of 
autonomous agents10, by which he means ‘something that can act on its own behalf in an 
environment’. This living entity is ‘something that can both reproduce itself and do at least one 
thermodynamic work cycle’ (2000: 64). Kauffman says, 
That bacterium, sculling up the glucose gradient, flagellum flailing in work cycles, is busy as 
hell doing ‘it’, reproducing and carrying out one or more work cycles. So too are all free-
living cells and organisms. We do, in blunt fact, link spontaneous and nonspontaneous 
processes in richly webbed pathways of interaction that achieve reproduction and the 
persistent work cycles by which we act on the world. Beavers do build dams; yet beavers are 
‘just’ physical systems. (2000: 64) 
In making this argument, Kauffman points to the importance of the role of adjoining or bordering. 
He points to the constitutive role of the particular material constraints (or context) in which any 
entity individuates. He also identifies the work of adjacency as the activity of ‘constructing 
constraints that can manipulate constraints’, thus drawing attention to the role of the border as the 
operator of the relation of the inside of an entity to its outside. Drawing on this analysis, we return 
to our observation on testing. Personalised recommendations are based on the making of nearness 
or adjacency in a multi-dimensional space but the implementation of collaborative filtering 
algorithms requires that they be subject to repeated testing in the specific kinds of relations to 
context that are commonly called participation. It is only insofar as a population’s relations to 
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multiple contexts (including data relating to liking, sensing and sharing as well as to time and space) 
are registered by the algorithm that the mode of individuation we are describing can happen at all. 
In other words, the (numerical-cultural) process of folding a whole into, across or within itself to 
make parts, of de- and re-contexting what Zuckerburg describes as the default social, is fundamental 
to the making of pathways of a-typical individuation.  As Seaver (2015) observes, while it is 
sometimes claimed that big data has no context, ‘context is everything’ for recommendation 
algorithms. 11  
It has been widely observed that algorithms do not operate in isolation from context-aware 
techniques of data capture and collection as they are organized in particular calculative 
infrastructures (Hayles 2002; Verran 2011).  Dourish, for example, notes,  
If the database is malleable, extensible, or revisable, it is so not simply because it is 
represented as electrical signals in a computer or magnetic traces on a disk; malleability, 
extensibility, and revisability depend too on the maintenance of constraints that make this 
specific collection of electrical signals or magnetic traces work as a database; and within 
these constraints, new materialities need to be acknowledged. (2014)   
Similarly, Amoore and Piotukh highlight the changing role of indexing practices in data collection 
activities:  
while structured data is territorially indexable, in the sense that it can be queried on the 
horizontal and vertical axes of spreadsheets within databases, so-called unstructured data 
demands new forms of indexing that allow for analysis to be deterritorialized (conducted 
across jurisdictions, or via distributed or cloud computing, for example) and to be conducted 
across diverse data forms – images, video, text in chat rooms, audio files and so on. (2015: 
345) 
As they also observe, the activity of ‘(ad-)joining’ is of particular importance in the deployment of 
these new forms of indexing. They give the example of IBM’s predictive policing:  
The linking of the data elements is performed through joins across data from different data 
sets, either on the basis of direct intersections with already indexed data (e.g. via a phone, 
credit card or social security number ingested from a database), or probabilistically, through 
correlations among data-points from different sources (e.g. text scraped from a Twitter 
account correlated with facial biometrically tagged images drawn from Facebook). (2015: 
345)   
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It is not just that there is more than one relevant context for recommendation algorithms. Different 
contexts are deliberately made to appear or disappear in different practices of context-ing. Indeed, 
this emphasis on context – what is sometimes called context-awareness - provides another 
compelling reason to describe personalisation as a pathway of a-typical individuation. A trajectory is 
not established in advance – as when we travel with the aim of moving from A to B, already knowing 
where B is – but in response to contexts that emerge in the making of a path.    
 
Becoming normal by being better than you 
We turn now to a discussion of the consequences of personalisation for the making of the default 
social, by considering the practice of normalization (Foucault 1991: Canguilhem 1991; Agamben 
1998; Hacking 1991).12 In his discussion of modes of governance linked to earlier forms of statistical 
normalisation, Hacking (1991) argues that debates concerning the setting of boundary conditions 
were fundamental to the way in which a population was governed by statistical laws. Updating this 
argument, we suggest that the work of adjoining in the personalisation practices described above 
involves an ongoing reorganization of boundary conditions (operating the relation between inside 
and outside, inclusion and exclusion through techniques of contexting) that transforms conditions of 
governmentality. This is especially clear in relation to the way in which practices of normalization 
now require the achievement of transitivity.13  On the one hand, the verbs of the vocabulary of 
participation – liking, sharing, linking – describe activities in which objects are repeatedly attached to 
persons; that is, they promote an algorithmic kind of linguistic transitivity (as in ‘things like this like 
people like you’). On the other hand, the data collected through the tracking of participation are 
then ordered transitively - in a mathematical sense - in an n-dimensional space of likeness or 
similitude. In these practices, the ‘new normal’ of individuation appears as a function of the ideal of 
transitive closure, an internal limit, in relation to which every possible relation (between verb and 
object) is partially ordered in such a way that the you that is a you emerges is similar to other ‘yous’, 
nearly but not quite the same as other ‘yous’, and never quite able to be consolidated as an ‘us’.  
While this limit can never be reached since it involves a never-ending in-filling in relation to a 
constantly changing population,14 we are nonetheless witnessing a proliferation of models of 
optimization across the fields of medicine, marketing, project management, and operational 
research (the last of which is sometimes described as ‘the science of better’, the significance of 
which will be made apparent below). In such models, optimal pathways of a-typical individuation are 
commonly identified in relation to specific objectives, often through software that merges data with 
parameters (as in the case of the parametric algorithms discussed by Parisi 2013) or employs 
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evolutionary modelling. As described above, one of the novel aspects of such techniques is the 
calculative deployment of recursion such that the aim of the action of ad-joining is not set in relation 
to a pre-defined target; rather pathway and target emerge together.  
Indeed, the term precision medicine is sometimes preferred to the synonyms personalised or 
stratified medicine because it acknowledges the significance of the necessarily dynamic fit between, 
for example, a cancer, drug target, resistance and side effects through repeated monitoring and the 
operationalization of the feedback loop between evaluation and intervention.15 In some cases, the 
methods of operational research are applied in conjunction with computational biology with the aim 
of identifying a pathway that has a ‘biologically meaningful objective’: a network is ‘designed (or 
revised) optimally’ to find ‘the natural circumstances that trigger one particular pathway but not 
others’ (http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en82/special/pathway-signatures).  An example of findings 
based upon pathways defined in molecular terms rather than by anatomy or traditional disease 
classification is the recently reported study (Mateo, Carreira, Sandhu et al. 2015) of the efficacy of 
the drug Olaparib, approved for treating ovarian cancers with BRCA1/2 mutations. This study built 
upon the finding that cancers are significantly heterogeneous at the molecular level and discovered 
that the variation within one, such as ovarian cancer, can be more marked than between cancers, 
such as ovarian and prostate, when tracked in terms of their differential sensitivity to particular 
treatments.   
More broadly, we can see the operation of principles of optimization modelling in the now 
ubiquitous ordinal tropes of ranking, which ensure that what counts as best is not given in advance, 
but rather emerges in a participative fashion  with the (continually changing) requirement to do and 
be better (Esposito 2013, Gerlitz and Lury 2014, Guyer 2010). In these practices the you that is 
addressed is both specific and a you ‘that is like everyone else’ (Chun 2011), only more or less so. 
The exhortation to ‘Believe in Better’16  pervades contemporary culture and might be seen as an 
appropriation of ‘optimism of the will’, recursively calibrating relations between individuals and 
populations to establish new forms of stratification (Fourcade and Healey 2013). In the requirement 
to be like but better than each other established in relation to such optimizing practices, you and I 
are not just different to each other but different-er: our differences are such that we are always both 
more and less different to each other. As the Optimizely commercial platform informs us, ‘Being 
personal is no longer optional’ (https://www.optimizely.com), or, as the name of a British financial 
services comparison website says, GoCompare 
(http://www.gocompare.com/ps/homepage/2.aspx/?Media=GG001&PST=1&device=c&PST=1&gclid
=Cj0KEQjwwYK8BRC0ta6LhOPC0v0BEiQApv6jYX5FTYS1gIsxfMkzlNlsaIMdTDT1Y7KLjtZwIIP8Y0MaAvB
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Y8P8HAQ.) Indeed, it is not just persons that are invited – or obliged - to participate in bettering 
themselves in the compositional practices of personalisation: universities, hospitals, museums, 
police forces, hotels, holidays, restaurants, brands and schools are also now frequently placed in 
dynamic relations of competitive comparison with each other by often mandatory or non-voluntary 
inclusion in the recursive partial orderings of ranking systems. While normalisation techniques 
sometimes provide a statistical snap-shot, a one-off cross-section of a population fixed in relation to 
a single environment (the nation, for example), personalisation is noteworthy for the way that it 
establishes (constantly shifting) grounds for dynamic stratification in relation to multiple norms in 
multiple environments.  
 
Signature pathways 
We consider one further aspect of the making of a pathway of a-typical individuation by exploring 
the use of ‘you’ as a shifter. In linguistic terms, shifters such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ as well as ‘I’ and ‘you’ 
can only be understood by reference to the context in which they are uttered. In other words, a 
shifter, sometimes also called a place-holder, is an indexical term whose meaning cannot be 
determined without referring to the message that is being communicated. The ‘you’ in a pathway of 
personalisation designates both the person to whom a message is directed and the ‘you’ that is 
contained in the message that is sent. In relation to our description of algorithmic personalisation, it 
is the suturing of this doubling in the shifter that makes a personalised address to the individual 
possible and also organises the activity of shifting as adjoining, creating constraints that can 
manipulate constraints in the making of a pathway.   
For Jakobson (1957), enunciation is encoded in a shifter in the statement itself. While Jakobson 
defines the shifter as an indexical symbol, Lacan defines it as an indexical signifier in order to 
problematize the distinction between enunciation and statement. As a signifier, the shifter ‘I’ is 
normally part of a statement. As an index, it is also normally part of the enunciation. For Lacan 
(1977), this division or distribution of the ‘I’ or ‘you’ does not merely illustrate the splitting of a 
subject; it is that split.  Drawing on these understandings of shifters, it seems that the indexical 
signifier is not stopped or ‘arrested’ by (representatives of) the symbolic order (Fenves 2002) in the 
anticipatory flux of personalising practices.17 In the context of (algorithmic) personalisation, it seems 
that the shifter is rather paused. Temporary halting incites participation or the folding of a context 
into the pathway. Indeed, it is this pausing, the marking of an interval, a stopping and starting that 
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repetitively gathers a collectivity. In assembling observers and observed, pausing allows for both 
observation and the observation of the observing (Kaldrack and Rohle 2014).   
 
Given that a pathway is a process of stopping and starting that repetitively gathers a collectivity, it is 
not surprising that the ability to identify some pathways but not others – the signature action Seaver 
describes - is currently the source of considerable interest. Frow’s discussion of signature and brand 
(2002) is illuminating in this respect.  He describes the signature as a shifter that sets up ‘a tension 
between representation and the represented’ and observes that the signature is not only an index of 
the act of framing (of adjoining or bordering), but also designates a naming right. Specifically, Frow 
argues that the power of the signature stems from the elision of the difference between the 
signature as an index and the taxonomic function of the proper name. This elision is effected in a 
particular way by the brand, he asserts, since ‘the “Name”, when one abstracts it from the signature 
it indicates, loses its ‘index’ character and becomes a ‘trademark’. Like the trademark, the name is of 
a symbolic order’ (Gandelman, quoted in Frow 2002: 63).  
 
As Frow observes, the brand’s economic significance as a ‘nexus between high-speed, continuous 
flow manufacturing and the reshaping of people’s habits and lives’ (Ohmann, 1996: 61 in Frow 2002: 
64) is growing. The detachment from indexicality is what provides the basis for using the signature as 
a claim to ownership. Importantly, however, Frow argues that the brand is in principle reducible to 
neither a product nor a corporation. As a quasi-signature or signature-effect, a brand name is 
routinely attached to a product range, and even to generations of product ranges, rather than to 
singular objects. It is precisely the divisibility of brand from product (in practices of bordering or 
framing) that makes possible the transfer of brand loyalty from one generation of a product to 
another. With Frow’s insights, we propose that recommendation algorithms create pathways of a-
typical individuation that are always distinct (divisible and detachable) from both object and person. 
In consequence, the ways in which such pathways acquire autonomy or not, and how that autonomy 
is recognized,18 constitute the heart of current debates on the sharing economy. It is here that the 
politics of collectivity, ownership and use are being reconfigured.  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that personalisation is a mode of a-typical individuation that is produced in 
techniques of recursive divisibility (the drawing of lines of inclusive exclusion and exclusive 
inclusion). As such, it provides an entry point into the constitution of what, following Mark 
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Zuckerburg, we have called the ‘default social’. Crucially, as a numbering practice, personalisation 
does not involve zooming (Day, Lury and Wakeford 2014), a performative gesture that operates the 
dynamism of moving from big to small, that is, a slide from one to many and back again, as if the 
only difference to be registered was that of an increase in a uniform quantity (as in what Badiou calls 
the count of one). Instead, this is a mode of numbering that constitutes a default social through 
forms of de- and re-aggregating, in which a variety of contexts are included and excluded, such that 
one is always more and less than one. In a recursive process that involves tracking bordering, 
folding, and pausing, the individual is precisely and momentarily specified as ‘a you’ (Chun 2016), 
that is, as a dividual (Raunig 2015; Strathern 1998). At the same time, pausing allows for the 
composition of heterogeneous (numerical-cultural) quantities, in which qualitative differences of 
mass are recognised at different levels of observation as matters of dimension and scale.  Put 
somewhat differently, the person that is addressed as a you is refracted in multiple partial orderings 
that allow for specific forms of comparison and competition (of better-ing) while the folding of 
contexts into the pathway creates new ways of configuring relations between participation and 
proportion, sharing, ownership and use in the identification of signature pathways.    
Importantly, our argument does not suggest that personalisation is replacing other modes of 
individuation. Rather it introduces new techniques that combine in a variety of ways to transform 
and intensify contemporary forms of individualism.19 As such, it merely confirms Hacking’s 
observation in relation to the history of the making up of people, ‘The less the determinism, the 
more the possibilities for constraint’ (1991: 194). 
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1  Celia Lury would like to acknowledge the support of ESRC, ES/K010689/1, and Sophie Day would 
like to acknowledge the support of the NIHR Imperial BioMedical Research Centre.   
2 These are practices that Agamben associates with sovereignty: bare life, he argues, has always 
been the object and the aim of state action, and it has always been subjected to elaborate 
mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion.  
3 Arvidsson argues that it is through personalisation that platforms such as Facebook will – on their 
own and in conjunction with third parties – benefit from the financialization of everyday life 
(Arvidsson forthcoming). 
 
4One of the most famous examples of this group is item-to-item collaborative filtering, an algorithm 
developed by Amazon. 
5 He continues, ‘The collaborative filtering matrix intermeshes the identities of users and items. It is 
both possible and typical for a collaborative filter to take no special account of either, organizing all 
entities strictly in terms of ratings: users are known as a [ranked] collection of relations to items and 
items are known as a [ranked] collection of relations to users. Persons and things enjoy no separate 
modes of existence in the matrix, which is indeed a function for translating one into the other’ 
(2012). In other words, collaborative filtering algorithms do not just determine that ‘Users like you 
liked items like this’; they also establish that ‘Items like this liked users like you’. This ‘collaboration’ 
is very different from that of the taste-bearing individuals explored by Bourdieu in Distinction (1987) 
where the relations are those of class and the exercise of taste, and involve symbolic violence. How 
pathways of ‘a-typical individuation’ will coincide with, transform or supersede such ‘demographic’ 
stratification remains to be seen. 
6 For Stafford, analogy is an associative method, a demonstrative and evidentiary practice. She says, 
‘Analogy correlates originality with continuity, what comes after with what went before…This 
transport of predicates involves a mutual sharing in, or partaking of, certain determinable 
quantitative and qualitative attributes through a mediating image’ (2001: 9). 
7 Bateson describes set theory diagrams as ‘a topological approach to the logic of classification’ 
(1999: 186). In such diagrams a frame is a mode of referring by ordering. As Tkacz observes in a 
commentary on Bateson, ‘A frame always sorts things as either belonging or not belonging and this 
process is mediated by axioms or principles – indeed, the axioms are what define the frame; they are 
the conditions of its possibility’ (2014: 71).  
8 Totaro and Ninno (2014) argue that what is fundamental to the recursive function is that repetition 
becomes the aim of action. 
9 Rabinow’s understanding of adjacency (2009) provides another, related set of terms. For Rabinow, 
the concept of adjacency is both analytic in that sets of relations must be decomposed and specified, 
and synthetic in that these relations must be recomposed and given new form. In this process, a 
neighbourhood emerges as the figure of what moves in tandem, together, the outcome of the 
interlinked processes of analysis and synthesis. 
10 Kauffman observes in relation to autonomous agents that ‘At the end of the cycle the system is 
poised to cycle again’ (2000: 68).   
11 The Optimizely platforms says that it can ‘Connect that browsing behavior, demographic 
information, contextual clues, and 1st- and 3rd-party data into a complete picture of your customer 
that you can use to power personalised experiences’. 
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12 Hacking (1991) argues that ‘normalcy’ is one of the most socially significant statistical meta-
concepts. We are pointing to the significance of normalization without, we hope, imputing any 
consensus to the very different concepts and trajectories implicated in this meta-concept across a 
range of disciplines. 
13 Transitivity has a range of meanings in different disciplines. In linguistics, for example, transitivity 
is a property of verbs that relates to whether a verb can take direct objects and how many such 
objects a verb can take. In mathematics, a binary relation over a set is transitive if, whenever an 
element a is related to an element b, and b in turn is related to an element c, a is also related to c. 
The partial ordering produced by the algorithms discussed above organise liking in relations that are 
transitive in both senses.  
14 Parisi offers another view of the limits of reason, specifically in relation to computation. She 
suggests that while parametric quantities are discrete entities that not only select data, as part of 
the software into which they are scripted, they may also be infected by data that they are not able 
to compute: “Instead of being a continuous flow of data, such as a topological binding of many 
actualities into one stream of ceaseless variation, the incomputable … is an infinite series of discrete 
yet incomplete data that immanently ingresses and becomes uniquely arranged into algorithmic 
sets, in which these data acquire togetherness and continuity’ (2013: 170). 
15 In precision medicine (or its synonyms), reference is commonly made to the 4Ps which 
are predictive, personalised, preventive and participatory. Some of the advocates of this approach 
describe current developments as a revolution, ‘fueled by several factors: first, an appreciation that 
medicine is an information science; second, syst ms or holistic approaches to studying the 
enormous complexities of disease; third, emerging technologies that will let us explore new 
dimensions of patient data space; and fourth, pow rful new analytical technologies—both 
mathematical and computational—that will let us decipher the billions of data points associated 
with each individual’ (Hood and Friend 2011). 
16 This is the strap-line employed by Skye, Rupert Murdoch’s telecommunications company, which 
encourages us all, no matter what, to ‘Believe in Better’. Elsewhere in the UK there is a chain of 
leisure centres that are called ‘Better’, a national insurance company that is called ‘More Than’ and 
Eurostar, the company that runs trains through the tunnel connecting the UK to continental Europe, 
deploys a campaign that employs the hashtag, ‘bettercloser’. There is a Canadian pharmaceutical 
company that has a range of products called Be.better; Nike’s current range of products includes a T-
shirt with the slogan ‘bettering’ written across the front; the shoe and clothing company Timberland 
use the advertising strap-line, ‘Best then. Better now’; the TSB (a UK bank) claims ‘Our TSB Classic 
Plus account, just got plusser’; the Wellcome Museum in London invites us in with the slogan ‘More 
than ever’; the i-Phone 6 is described as ‘bigger than bigger’; a recent advertisement for an electric 
car (an Audi) insists, ‘Like a car, but better’. 
17 It is hard to avoid drawing a parallel with Althusser’s discussion of interpellation: the policeman 
who calls out ‘Hey, you there’. Althusser’s approach draws on Lacan’s various discussions of the 
mirror stage, a form of pausing in which infants encounter an external sense of coherence, 
producing a sense of ‘I’ and ‘you’, that comes to represent a permanent structure of alienation for 
Lacan. 
18 A paradigmatic example is the recent successful filing of a patent by Amazon for a method of 
speculative or anticipatory shipping. See Coleman (forthcoming). 
19 In marketing and many policy fields, for example, the design of optimal pathways is informed by 
behavioural economics, in which doing is deployed as a measure of being. In the terms of our 
analysis, ‘nudging’ is the identification and operation of constraints that can manipulate constraints, 
and the current investment by business and government in a ‘context aware’ computational 
infrastructure seems designed to support the rise of personalisation as a mode of individuation that 
will afford the possibility of dynamic stratification. 
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Algorithmic personalisation as a mode of individuation 1 
‘The less the determinism, the more the possibilities for constraint.’ (Hacking 1991: 194).  
 
Introduction 
This is the age of personalisation. Personalising practices permeate everyday life in the UK - we are 
invited to participate in personalised medical, health and care services, to benefit from personalised 
customer experiences, to find our way with personalised maps, acquire a personalised education, 
keep up-to-date with personalised news, get a bargain with personalised prices and so on. To give 
some more concrete examples: in 2007 the UK Government published Putting People First: A shared 
vision and commitment to finding new ways to improve social care in England 
(http://www.dh.gov.uk/dr_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/
dh_081119.pdf). The paper outlined the government’s intention to transform adult social care so 
‘that every person who receives support, whether provided by statutory services or funded by 
themselves, will have choice and control over the shape of that support in all care settings’. This 
‘vision’ describes itself as a totally different approach to an historic ‘one size fits all’ system. With an 
initial focus on transforming social care and support services, the paper proposes that principles of 
personalisation be embedded in a range of other service areas such as health and education. An 
example from the field of health and well-being is PatientsLikeMe, a website 
(http://www.patientslikeme.com) that combines features of traditional qualitative on-line patient 
communities with quantitative data-collection; the (trade-marked) strap-line is ‘Live better, 
together!’. This website has 300,000 members, who ‘share’ over 23,000 diseases, and have 
contributed over 25 million data points about their diseases, resulting in over 50 published research 
studies. The website says, 
By sharing health data on PatientsLikeMe, people not only help themselves, but help others 
who can learn from their experiences, and advance research. … Learn from others, connect 
with people like you, track your health. 
The platform is also described as a tool that helps patients find a ‘just-in-time’, ‘someone-like-me’ 
peer who can be relied upon to compare options and aid decision-making. A final example of 
personalisation is the recommendation service Stitch Fix (https://www.stitchfix.com), a website that 
describes itself as ‘Your partner in style’ and which seeks to recommend clothing for women on a 
personal basis. The business proposition is that the recommendation service - a composite of 
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algorithmic and human reasoning - knows better than the customer herself what clothes she will 
like: selected items of clothing are sent directly to her, without a preview, as otherwise her 
prejudices might prevent her from choosing items that she, unknowingly, will really like.   
The question this paper seeks to address is: what kind of individuation (Simondon 1992; Foucault 
2001) is personalisation? We ask this question in order to explore the implications of personalisation 
for how we live together, that is, for forms of sociality. We draw on Simondon’s refusal to start from 
the pre-constituted individual and instead focus on a process of individuation. For Simondon, the 
individual – or person in our case – is neither given in advance nor ever final; rather, it is always 
coming into being. To this fundamental insight, we add the assumption that personalisation is not 
only personal: it is never about only one person, just me or just you, but always involves other 
individuation, in our case, the individuation of a type of person. Indeed, our argument will be that 
personalisation is a mode of individuation in which entities are precisely specified by way of a 
process of recursive inclusion in types or classes as part of the making of what we describe as an a-
typical pathway. To make this argument, we explore the use of recommendation algorithms to sort 
or classify people, analysing the way in which individuals are addressed as ‘a you’, while their 
membership of types or classes of person is perpetually revised. The you of personalisation is 
simultaneously singular and plural. Our conclusion is that the familiar recognition that 
personalisation seems to provide – knowing you better than you yourself do - should not be 
considered as merely a more precise form of individuation. To the contrary, personalisation also 
constrains who and how we can be.  
Recognising that many of the modern categories with which we think about people and their 
activities were put in place through the use of numbers (Hacking 1991), we develop our analysis of 
algorithmic personalisation by drawing on an understanding of number as composition (Day, Lury 
and Wakeford, 2014).  This approach starts from the assumption that numbering is everywhere 
(Hayles 2014), even though numbers may not always be visible. As such, it seeks to situate 
contemporary analyses of algorithms within the wider context of cultures of numbering. As (even) 
Badiou (2008) remarks, ‘A ‘cultural fact’ is a numerical fact. And, conversely, whatever produces 
number can be culturally located; that which has no number shall have no name either’ (Badiou 
2008: 2-3). In a similar vein, Totaro and Ninno (2014) also comment on the pervasiveness of 
numbering, but focus specifically on the performativity of the recursive function, which, they argue, 
provides ‘an interpretive key to modern rationality’: 
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The notion that the ‘logic of numbers’ operates exclusively on numbers is misleading. In the 
second half of the last century, the theory of recursive functions has made it clear that the 
concept of calculation is very general and does not necessarily imply the manipulation of 
numerical symbols. (2014: 2) (See also Neyland 2014; Totaro and Ninno 2016.) 
More circumspectly, Heinz notes that ‘the observation and regulation of performances today has 
become mutual and reflexive, generalised and anonymous, and it is now increasingly based on 
observations and comparisons in terms of numbers’ (Heinz 2011: 22). 
Our compositional approach acknowledges the pervasiveness of numbering in contemporary society 
by looking at what numbering does, rather than what numbering is. Adopting a felicitous analogy 
from Verran, we think of numbers in the same way as anthropologists do kin: numbers both are and 
have relations just as people are and have relations (Verran 2010: 171; see also Urton 1997; 
Mackenzie 2014). In other words, we propose that it is as working relations that numbers are able to 
perform: to travel, to make possible comparison, conversion, and exchange, to be stored, to inform, 
and to make the same or different. By looking at how numbers are composed or formed in relations, 
and how social and cultural practices are formed (in part) by number, we aim to show how 
numbering is a re-presentation - in this case, of persons - that always holds more than one 
presentation.  
To understand how it is that we have become habituated to declaring, measuring and sharing our 
personal characteristics, behaviours and opinions in the UK in order to carry out mundane activities, 
we begin by situating our analysis in the context of what has been called a ‘like economy’ (Gerlitz 
and Helmond 2013). This context is important, we suggest, insofar as it makes relational value 
available for computational calculation.  Drawing on our compositional approach to numbering, we 
then develop a set of terms – tracking, bordering, folding and pausing – that lead us to describe 
forms of personalisation that are performed by recommendation algorithms as the making of a 
pathway of a-typical individuation. Critically, this pathway creates ‘a’ person or individual that is 
always provisional and corresponds only partially with the type or category in which it is included, 
whether this concerns what a person might buy, like, share or possess. The term pathway is 
intended to capture this category of person, a ‘category’ that is never static but always changing and 
always in motion. While our analytic focus is on the example of algorithmic personalisation, and in 
particular algorithmic personalisation that involves the use of collaborative filters, we also make 
references to other examples which share the same logic.   
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Liking and likeness 
The rise of a ‘like economy’ begins, so Gerlitz and Helmond argue (2013), with the arrival of Google 
in the late 1990s. It is widely known that Google’s early success stemmed from its use of a search 
engine that shifted the value determination of websites from hits alone to hits and links. The 
hyperlink analysis algorithm, PageRank, enabled calculation of the relative importance and ranking 
of a page within a larger set of pages, based on the number of in-links to the page and, recursively, 
the value of the pages linking to that page and so on. All links do not have equal value in this type of 
search engine, as links from authoritative sources or links from sources receiving many in-links are 
weighted in the algorithm.  
The use of weighted measures of linking was a first step towards inscribing the capacity to identify 
and intensify ‘relational value’ in search engine algorithms (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013; see also 
Feuz, Fuller and Stalder 2011). And it is this relational value, we propose, that is central to 
personalisation insofar as it makes relations between people available for computational calculation. 
Since this first step, the capacity to make relations of linking – or sharing - has been significantly 
extended as the determination of ‘authority’ has changed in line with the participatory features of 
Web 2.0. More web users now participate in making connections between websites through the 
creation and exchange of user-generated content (as well as gaming and the purchase of position). 
In particular, social buttons allow users to share, recommend, like or bookmark content, posts and 
pages across various social media platforms. In 2006, Facebook launched a share icon as a way for 
someone to share web content and invite re-sharing and then, in 2009, it introduced the Like button. 
In 2010, the company extended the capacities of the Like button to link by introducing an external 
Like button, a plugin that could be implemented by any webmaster, potentially rendering all web 
content like-able. Significantly, the external ‘Like’ button does not only capture actual likes, but also 
aggregates all activities performed on a web object: the number of likes and shares, further likes and 
comments on stories, and the number of inbox messages containing the object as an attachment. In 
another important development, Facebook’s Open Graph Protocol opened up their social graph – a 
representation of people and their connections – for external content, allowing for a controlled way 
of exchanging preformatted data between Facebook and the external web.  
It is through the use of these and other techniques, so Gerlitz and Helmond argue, that Facebook has 
been able to build a ‘like economy’, that is, an economy that builds on and exploits relational value, 
mediated by participation. They further suggest that this economy produces what, using Mark 
Zuckerberg’s own phrase, they call ‘the default social’. To this analysis we want to add the 
observation that the relations between the individual and the population that characterize this new 
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social are both participatory and participative in that users may participate knowingly (participatory) 
or unknowingly (participative). Moreover, participation in the default social is mediated by 
techniques of exclusive inclusion and inclusive exclusion (Agamben 1998).2 On the one hand, the 
Open Graph is able to include non-users of Facebook as the external Like button cookie can trace 
non-users and add any information gained as anonymous data to the Facebook database and, on the 
other hand, a user’s explicitly invited activities may be excluded or rendered invisible to other users 
if they are not sufficiently highly ranked in the dimensions the graph provides. These oscillating 
dynamics - of being excluded in ways that inform the ordering of those included, and being included 
but not in ways that allow you to understand the terms of your membership - were intensified 
further in 2011 when Facebook expanded the possibilities of ‘invisible’ participation by proliferating 
custom actions:  
When creating an app, developers are prompted to define verbs that are shown as user 
actions and to specify the object on which these actions can be performed. Instead of being 
confined to ‘like’ external web content, users can now ‘read’, ‘watch’, ‘discuss’ or perform 
other actions. (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013: 1353)  
Gerlitz and Helmond conclude their analysis of the emergence of the like economy by suggesting 
that Facebook is being developed as an ‘infrastructure of decentralised data production and 
recentralised data processing’ (2013: 1357). While they do not discuss the role of recommendation 
systems within this infrastructure, these have become increasingly important operators of the de- 
and re-centralising practices of the economy Gerlitz and Helmond describe. Structured by the 
‘participatory’ practices of inclusive exclusion and exclusive inclusion, recommendation algorithms 
penetrate all corners of the Internet, making personalised recommendations - directly and indirectly 
- to individuals with interests in a variety of fields, including movies, music, news, books, research 
publications, restaurants, jokes, financial services, products of all sorts and persons (for example, in 
online dating).  It is to these algorithms that we now turn.  
 
Recommendation Algorithms 
While very many different kinds of algorithms are used in recommendation systems, two main kinds 
are distinguished, collaborative filtering algorithms and content sharing algorithms. Sometimes, as in 
Netflix, they are combined. The former group of algorithms is based on large amounts of digital data 
on users’ behavior, activities or preferences and leads to predictions of what users will like based on 
their similarity to others (see further below). An example is Last.fm (http://www.last.fm), a music 
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‘station’ or streaming service that personalises the music it transmits by observing the music an 
individual has listened to on a regular basis and comparing those tracks with the listening behaviour 
of other individuals. The calculative process involved in this group of algorithms is sometimes 
described as ‘leveraging’ the behavior of users3 since it requires the participation of many users to 
produce personalised recommendations for one person.4 Content-based filtering methods, in 
contrast, are based on a description of an item in terms of discrete characteristics; the algorithm is 
then designed to produce recommendations for individual users of items that have similar 
properties to those that the individual liked in the past (or is examining in the present).  Pandora 
Internet Radio (currently restricted to listeners in the USA, Australia and New Zealand because of 
licensing restrictions) is an example: it makes use of an algorithm that uses properties of a song or 
artists (a subset of the 450 attributes provided by the Music Genome Project) in order to seed a 
station to transmit personalised music.    
We focus on collaborative filtering algorithms, partly because their ability to make successful 
predictions across fields is held to be stronger than that of content based algorithms, but also 
because they require and exploit ‘participatory’ methods to develop novel classificatory techniques.  
As such, they allow us to identify distinctive aspects of personalisation as a mode of individuation. 
Crucially for the use of such algorithms, information relating to ‘pre-existing’ or demographic 
qualities of the person or entity concerned is not required to produce personalised 
recommendations. Instead the information required is produced through the aggregation of the 
ongoing participation of both the individual to whom the recommendations are made and other 
users of social media. Rather than allocating users to a pre-existing class, group or type (typically a 
socio-demographic stratum), the properties of which are presumed to be known in advance, the 
operations of collaborative filtering start from the premise that (individual) customers who share 
(that is, have in common) some preferences will also share others. This single but powerful 
assumption is of value for those developing algorithms in that ‘the only information [they need] to 
work is a set of numerical ratings — specific information about users or items to be recommended is 
not necessary’ (Seaver 2012).  
It is worth exploring how these numerical ratings are turned into personalised recommendations in 
some detail. A helpful analysis is provided by Seaver (2012), who describes the ‘signature action’ of 
collaborative filtering algorithms in terms of the operation of a grid, with items along one side, users 
along the other, and numerical ratings at their intersections (see also Bowker 2014; 
http;//personalisedcommunication.net/the-project/). Significantly, this grid is a matrix, that is, a grid 
with the formatted capacity to map (or perform) network transformations:  
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This matrix is mostly empty (or “sparse”), since most users will have not rated most items. 
The work of the collaborative filtering algorithm … is to predict what values will show up in 
the empty spaces of the matrix. These predictions are then provided in some form to the 
user as recommendations. (Seaver 2012) 
Seaver continues, ‘at any given time, the matrix is in an anticipatory flux: new ratings from users 
arrive constantly, displacing their predicted values and shifting the others. The calculative operations 
involved in this in-filling process is the signature action within the matrix — blank values are 
replaced by predictions, which are then replaced by actual ratings’.5 In the next stage described by 
Seaver, the numbers from the matrix are statistically analysed and their variance is mapped to a 
number of dimensions or axes.  Users who are ‘near’ each other on this multi-dimensional 
coordinate system are held to be similar (like each other), and a user will be recommended items 
from the neighbourhood around them. It is this calculative activity that leads to the paradigmatic 
claim of such algorithms to specify the individual in the complex conjugated personalised address: 
‘People like you like things like this’.  
But how, if at all, does this description of the calculative logic in recommendation algorithms help us 
understand what is distinctive about personalisation as a mode of individuation?  Seaver concludes 
that preference and similarity are collapsed in this calculative system since “liking” and “being like” 
are equated. We consider that an understanding of the composition of these relations will help us 
see how numbers are rendered consequential for the making up of persons (Hacking 1991). How is 
this equation accomplished or, in our terms, composed? If we are to address the specificity of 
personalisation as a mode of individuation we need to see the particular ways in which numbers 
both are and have relations.  
 
Pathways of a-typical individuation 
Seaver’s claim about the equivalence between liking and likeness in recommendation algorithms is 
less critical to our argument than his observation that this calculative matrix is in a constant state of 
anticipatory flux. Indeed, we propose that the emphasis on perpetual renewal means that the 
equation of ‘liking’ and ‘being like’ that is accomplished by these recommendation algorithms is not 
about establishing relations of absolute equivalence. Instead, we suggest, the calculative activity 
that produces the anticipatory flux of the matrix involves an ongoing series of approximations in 
which ‘being like’ and ‘liking’ are continually made more and less like each other in a variety of ways. 
Such approximations, we would emphasise, are designed to be subject to constant testing.  
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As Seaver points out, such approximations vary hugely depending on the calculative space in which 
they are produced (3 or 9 axes or dimensions, for example). Their value - that is, their ability to 
produce personalised recommendations in terms of criteria of accuracy, diversity (of 
recommendations), privacy protection, and trust - is realised as they are tested repeatedly in 
relation to data collected via a whole variety of participatory methods and metrics including those 
outlined above. In other words, the personalised address to ‘a you’ is not achieved through the 
collapse of liking and likeness, preference and similarity, but through a carefully calibrated 
sequencing of their possible inter-relationship.  Crucially, this process does not only involve the 
statistical making of proximity or nearness but also the turning of near-ness into next-ness, a process 
of bordering or adjoining. We conclude therefore that personalisation is not the collapse of liking 
and likeness but the making of a pathway, a dynamic series of approximations of similarity and 
preference that makes persons.  
Indeed, this pathway can be described as a mode of a-typical individuation. What do we mean, 
though, in our use of a-typical? Certainly it might seem counter-intuitive to use the term at all if it is 
understood to mean ‘not typical’ or ‘not of a type’, since we have argued throughout that 
personalisation is a mode of individuation that involves generalisation through the (repeated or 
recursive) inclusion of an entity in a type or class. While we propose that personalisation is a mode 
of inclusion that is not that of inclusion in a class or type defined by inherent or pre-given properties 
(using a-typical in a negative sense), we also want to use the term to describe a mode of recursive 
inclusion, in which both the individual and the type are repeatedly specified anew. To do so, we 
draw on multiple – etymologically unrelated – meanings of ‘a’. 
The first set of meanings are associated with the use of ‘a’ as the indefinite article, since this use 
directly indicates membership in a type or class of people, things or events (‘this is a cat’, ‘this is a 
friend of mine’). The indefiniteness of this inclusion, while appearing to indicate a lack of 
determination, has its own logic: for example, as well as meaning ‘one single’ or ‘any’, ‘a’ is also 
commonly used to introduce someone or something for the first time. It allows for a mode of 
inclusion in a type or category on the basis of criteria that are not pre-given but rather open to 
further (indefinite) specification (‘If that is what you think, then you are not a friend of mine because 
a friend of mine would not think that’). As the indefinite article, ‘a’ is also used to specify both 
someone or something as being like someone or something else (‘you are a star’) and to express 
rates or ratios, as in ‘for each’ or ‘per’.  Our use of the term a-typical thus calls up the operation of 
the two analytically distinct, but historically intertwined, understandings of analogy identified by 
Stafford (2001): participation (similitude, mimesis, likeness) and proportion (ratio).6  These are 
combined to produce principles of inclusion that are subject – recursively – to further revision: their 
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combination is the means by which the you that is ‘a you’ becomes a recursive shifter (Chun 2011, 
2016). 
To these meanings of ‘a’ as the indefinite article, we wish to add a further meaning, that is, ‘a’ as a 
variant spelling of ‘ad-‘, denoting motion or direction, a reduction or change into, an addition, 
increase or intensification, as in ‘adjoin’ or ‘adjacent’. The etymology of these terms relates to the 
Latin adjacentem, adjacens; from adjacere, ‘to lie at, to border upon, to lie near’; from ad-, "to" + 
jacere, "to lie, to rest"; literally, "to throw".  Our use of the term a-typical to describe pathways of 
individuation is thus intended to describe the ways in which collaborative filtering algorithms are 
designed to allow for the ongoing re-definition of principles of inclusion and exclusion via the 
recursive activity of adjoining or the work of adjacency: what we describe as the compositional 
practice of bordering or framing.7  In this practice, the aim is to create, not equivalence, but a 
topological invariance: that is, the aim is to achieve a continuity of a recursive function8 such that 
likeness (‘People like you’) is iteratively produced as a pathway through a massively aggregated de- 
and re-contexting of liking.  
How this is accomplished in the multi-dimensional calculative space of recommendation algorithms 
can be illustrated by way of a consideration of ‘the next adjacent possible’, a term developed by the 
theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman (2000).9 Put briefly, Kauffman understands life in terms of 
autonomous agents10, by which he means ‘something that can act on its own behalf in an 
environment’. This living entity is ‘something that can both reproduce itself and do at least one 
thermodynamic work cycle’ (2000: 64). Kauffman says, 
That bacterium, sculling up the glucose gradient, flagellum flailing in work cycles, is busy as 
hell doing ‘it’, reproducing and carrying out one or more work cycles. So too are all free-
living cells and organisms. We do, in blunt fact, link spontaneous and nonspontaneous 
processes in richly webbed pathways of interaction that achieve reproduction and the 
persistent work cycles by which we act on the world. Beavers do build dams; yet beavers are 
‘just’ physical systems. (2000: 64) 
In making this argument, Kauffman points to the importance of the role of adjoining or bordering. 
He points to the constitutive role of the particular material constraints (or context) in which any 
entity individuates. He also identifies the work of adjacency as the activity of ‘constructing 
constraints that can manipulate constraints’, thus drawing attention to the role of the border as the 
operator of the relation of the inside of an entity to its outside. Drawing on this analysis, we return 
to our observation on testing. Personalised recommendations are based on the making of nearness 
or adjacency in a multi-dimensional space but the implementation of collaborative filtering 
Page 28 of 39Theory Culture & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10 
 
algorithms requires that they be subject to repeated testing in the specific kinds of relations to 
context that are commonly called participation. It is only insofar as a population’s relations to 
multiple contexts (including data relating to liking, sensing and sharing as well as to time and space) 
are registered by the algorithm that the mode of individuation we are describing can happen at all. 
In other words, the (numerical-cultural) process of folding a whole into, across or within itself to 
make parts, of de- and re-contexting what Zuckerburg describes as the default social, is fundamental 
to the making of pathways of a-typical individuation.  As Seaver (2015) observes, while it is 
sometimes claimed that big data has no context, ‘context is everything’ for recommendation 
algorithms. 11  
It has been widely observed that algorithms do not operate in isolation from context-aware 
techniques of data capture and collection as they are organized in particular calculative 
infrastructures (Hayles 2002; Verran 2011).  Dourish, for example, notes,  
If the database is malleable, extensible, or revisable, it is so not simply because it is 
represented as electrical signals in a computer or magnetic traces on a disk; malleability, 
extensibility, and revisability depend too on the maintenance of constraints that make this 
specific collection of electrical signals or magnetic traces work as a database; and within 
these constraints, new materialities need to be acknowledged. (2014)   
Similarly, Amoore and Piotukh highlight the changing role of indexing practices in data collection 
activities:  
while structured data is territorially indexable, in the sense that it can be queried on the 
horizontal and vertical axes of spreadsheets within databases, so-called unstructured data 
demands new forms of indexing that allow for analysis to be deterritorialized (conducted 
across jurisdictions, or via distributed or cloud computing, for example) and to be conducted 
across diverse data forms – images, video, text in chat rooms, audio files and so on. (2015: 
345) 
As they also observe, the activity of ‘(ad-)joining’ is of particular importance in the deployment of 
these new forms of indexing. They give the example of IBM’s predictive policing:  
The linking of the data elements is performed through joins across data from different data 
sets, either on the basis of direct intersections with already indexed data (e.g. via a phone, 
credit card or social security number ingested from a database), or probabilistically, through 
correlations among data-points from different sources (e.g. text scraped from a Twitter 
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account correlated with facial biometrically tagged images drawn from Facebook). (2015: 
345)   
It is not just that there is more than one relevant context for recommendation algorithms. Different 
contexts are deliberately made to appear or disappear in different practices of context-ing. Indeed, 
this emphasis on context – what is sometimes called context-awareness - provides another 
compelling reason to describe personalisation as a pathway of a-typical individuation. A trajectory is 
not established in advance – as when we travel with the aim of moving from A to B, already knowing 
where B is – but in response to contexts that emerge in the making of a path.    
 
Becoming normal by being better than you 
We turn now to a discussion of the consequences of personalisation for the making of the default 
social, by considering the practice of normalization (Foucault 1991: Canguilhem 1991; Agamben 
1998; Hacking 1991).12 In his discussion of modes of governance linked to earlier forms of statistical 
normalisation, Hacking (1991) argues that debates concerning the setting of boundary conditions 
were fundamental to the way in which a population was governed by statistical laws. Updating this 
argument, we suggest that the work of adjoining in the personalisation practices described above 
involves an ongoing reorganization of boundary conditions (operating the relation between inside 
and outside, inclusion and exclusion through techniques of contexting) that transforms conditions of 
governmentality. This is especially clear in relation to the way in which practices of normalization 
now require the achievement of transitivity.13  On the one hand, the verbs of the vocabulary of 
participation – liking, sharing, linking – describe activities in which objects are repeatedly attached to 
persons; that is, they promote an algorithmic kind of linguistic transitivity (as in ‘things like this like 
people like you’). On the other hand, the data collected through the tracking of participation are 
then ordered transitively - in a mathematical sense - in an n-dimensional space of likeness or 
similitude. In these practices, the ‘new normal’ of individuation appears as a function of the ideal of 
transitive closure, an internal limit, in relation to which every possible relation (between verb and 
object) is partially ordered in such a way that the you that is a you emerges is similar to other ‘yous’, 
nearly but not quite the same as other ‘yous’, and never quite able to be consolidated as an ‘us’.  
While this limit can never be reached since it involves a never-ending in-filling in relation to a 
constantly changing population,14 we are nonetheless witnessing a proliferation of models of 
optimization across the fields of medicine, marketing, project management, and operational 
research (the last of which is sometimes described as ‘the science of better’, the significance of 
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which will be made apparent below). In such models, optimal pathways of a-typical individuation are 
commonly identified in relation to specific objectives, often through software that merges data with 
parameters (as in the case of the parametric algorithms discussed by Parisi 2013) or employs 
evolutionary modelling. As described above, one of the novel aspects of such techniques is the 
calculative deployment of recursion such that the aim of the action of ad-joining is not set in relation 
to a pre-defined target; rather pathway and target emerge together.  
Indeed, the term precision medicine is sometimes preferred to the synonyms personalised or 
stratified medicine because it acknowledges the significance of the necessarily dynamic fit between, 
for example, a cancer, drug target, resistance and side effects through repeated monitoring and the 
operationalization of the feedback loop between evaluation and intervention.15 In some cases, the 
methods of operational research are applied in conjunction with computational biology with the aim 
of identifying a pathway that has a ‘biologically meaningful objective’: a network is ‘designed (or 
revised) optimally’ to find ‘the natural circumstances that trigger one particular pathway but not 
others’ (http://ercim-news.ercim.eu/en82/special/pathway-signatures).  An example of findings 
based upon pathways defined in molecular terms rather than by anatomy or traditional disease 
classification is the recently reported study (Mateo, Carreira, Sandhu et al. 2015) of the efficacy of 
the drug Olaparib, approved for treating ovarian cancers with BRCA1/2 mutations. This study built 
upon the finding that cancers are significantly heterogeneous at the molecular level and discovered 
that the variation within one, such as ovarian cancer, can be more marked than between cancers, 
such as ovarian and prostate, when tracked in terms of their differential sensitivity to particular 
treatments.   
More broadly, we can see the operation of principles of optimization modelling in the now 
ubiquitous ordinal tropes of ranking, which ensure that what counts as best is not given in advance, 
but rather emerges in a participative fashion  with the (continually changing) requirement to do and 
be better (Esposito 2013, Gerlitz and Lury 2014, Guyer 2010). In these practices the you that is 
addressed is both specific and a you ‘that is like everyone else’ (Chun 2011), only more or less so. 
The exhortation to ‘Believe in Better’16  pervades contemporary culture and might be seen as an 
appropriation of ‘optimism of the will’, recursively calibrating relations between individuals and 
populations to establish new forms of stratification (Fourcade and Healey 2013). In the requirement 
to be like but better than each other established in relation to such optimizing practices, you and I 
are not just different to each other but different-er: our differences are such that we are always both 
more and less different to each other. As the Optimizely commercial platform informs us, ‘Being 
personal is no longer optional’ (https://www.optimizely.com), or, as the name of a British financial 
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services comparison website says, GoCompare 
(http://www.gocompare.com/ps/homepage/2.aspx/?Media=GG001&PST=1&device=c&PST=1&gclid
=Cj0KEQjwwYK8BRC0ta6LhOPC0v0BEiQApv6jYX5FTYS1gIsxfMkzlNlsaIMdTDT1Y7KLjtZwIIP8Y0MaAvB
Y8P8HAQ.) Indeed, it is not just persons that are invited – or obliged - to participate in bettering 
themselves in the compositional practices of personalisation: universities, hospitals, museums, 
police forces, hotels, holidays, restaurants, brands and schools are also now frequently placed in 
dynamic relations of competitive comparison with each other by often mandatory or non-voluntary 
inclusion in the recursive partial orderings of ranking systems. While normalisation techniques 
sometimes provide a statistical snap-shot, a one-off cross-section of a population fixed in relation to 
a single environment (the nation, for example), personalisation is noteworthy for the way that it 
establishes (constantly shifting) grounds for dynamic stratification in relation to multiple norms in 
multiple environments.  
 
Signature pathways 
We consider one further aspect of the making of a pathway of a-typical individuation by exploring 
the use of ‘you’ as a shifter. In linguistic terms, shifters such as ‘this’ and ‘that’ as well as ‘I’ and ‘you’ 
can only be understood by reference to the context in which they are uttered. In other words, a 
shifter, sometimes also called a place-holder, is an indexical term whose meaning cannot be 
determined without referring to the message that is being communicated. The ‘you’ in a pathway of 
personalisation designates both the person to whom a message is directed and the ‘you’ that is 
contained in the message that is sent. In relation to our description of algorithmic personalisation, it 
is the suturing of this doubling in the shifter that makes a personalised address to the individual 
possible and also organises the activity of shifting as adjoining, creating constraints that can 
manipulate constraints in the making of a pathway.   
For Jakobson (1957), enunciation is encoded in a shifter in the statement itself. While Jakobson 
defines the shifter as an indexical symbol, Lacan defines it as an indexical signifier in order to 
problematize the distinction between enunciation and statement. As a signifier, the shifter ‘I’ is 
normally part of a statement. As an index, it is also normally part of the enunciation. For Lacan 
(1977), this division or distribution of the ‘I’ or ‘you’ does not merely illustrate the splitting of a 
subject; it is that split.  Drawing on these understandings of shifters, it seems that the indexical 
signifier is not stopped or ‘arrested’ by (representatives of) the symbolic order (Fenves 2002) in the 
anticipatory flux of personalising practices.17 In the context of (algorithmic) personalisation, it seems 
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that the shifter is rather paused. Temporary halting incites participation or the folding of a context 
into the pathway. Indeed, it is this pausing, the marking of an interval, a stopping and starting that 
repetitively gathers a collectivity. In assembling observers and observed, pausing allows for both 
observation and the observation of the observing (Kaldrack and Rohle 2014).   
 
Given that a pathway is a process of stopping and starting that repetitively gathers a collectivity, it is 
not surprising that the ability to identify some pathways but not others – the signature action Seaver 
describes - is currently the source of considerable interest. Frow’s discussion of signature and brand 
(2002) is illuminating in this respect.  He describes the signature as a shifter that sets up ‘a tension 
between representation and the represented’ and observes that the signature is not only an index of 
the act of framing (of adjoining or bordering), but also designates a naming right. Specifically, Frow 
argues that the power of the signature stems from the elision of the difference between the 
signature as an index and the taxonomic function of the proper name. This elision is effected in a 
particular way by the brand, he asserts, since ‘the “Name”, when one abstracts it from the signature 
it indicates, loses its ‘index’ character and becomes a ‘trademark’. Like the trademark, the name is of 
a symbolic order’ (Gandelman, quoted in Frow 2002: 63).  
 
As Frow observes, the brand’s economic significance as a ‘nexus between high-speed, continuous 
flow manufacturing and the reshaping of people’s habits and lives’ (Ohmann, 1996: 61 in Frow 2002: 
64) is growing. The detachment from indexicality is what provides the basis for using the signature as 
a claim to ownership. Importantly, however, Frow argues that the brand is in principle reducible to 
neither a product nor a corporation. As a quasi-signature or signature-effect, a brand name is 
routinely attached to a product range, and even to generations of product ranges, rather than to 
singular objects. It is precisely the divisibility of brand from product (in practices of bordering or 
framing) that makes possible the transfer of brand loyalty from one generation of a product to 
another. With Frow’s insights, we propose that recommendation algorithms create pathways of a-
typical individuation that are always distinct (divisible and detachable) from both object and person. 
In consequence, the ways in which such pathways acquire autonomy or not, and how that autonomy 
is recognized,18 constitute the heart of current debates on the sharing economy. It is here that the 
politics of collectivity, ownership and use are being reconfigured.  
 
Conclusion 
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We have argued that personalisation is a mode of a-typical individuation that is produced in 
techniques of recursive divisibility (the drawing of lines of inclusive exclusion and exclusive 
inclusion). As such, it provides an entry point into the constitution of what, following Mark 
Zuckerburg, we have called the ‘default social’. Crucially, as a numbering practice, personalisation 
does not involve zooming (Day, Lury and Wakeford 2014), a performative gesture that operates the 
dynamism of moving from big to small, that is, a slide from one to many and back again, as if the 
only difference to be registered was that of an increase in a uniform quantity (as in what Badiou calls 
the count of one). Instead, this is a mode of numbering that constitutes a default social through 
forms of de- and re-aggregating, in which a variety of contexts are included and excluded, such that 
one is always more and less than one. In a recursive process that involves tracking bordering, 
folding, and pausing, the individual is precisely and momentarily specified as ‘a you’ (Chun 2016), 
that is, as a dividual (Raunig 2015; Strathern 1998). At the same time, pausing allows for the 
composition of heterogeneous (numerical-cultural) quantities, in which qualitative differences of 
mass are recognised at different levels of observation as matters of dimension and scale.  Put 
somewhat differently, the person that is addressed as a you is refracted in multiple partial orderings 
that allow for specific forms of comparison and competition (of better-ing) while the folding of 
contexts into the pathway creates new ways of configuring relations between participation and 
proportion, sharing, ownership and use in the identification of signature pathways.    
Importantly, our argument does not suggest that personalisation is replacing other modes of 
individuation. Rather it introduces new techniques that combine in a variety of ways to transform 
and intensify contemporary forms of individualism.19 As such, it merely confirms Hacking’s 
observation in relation to the history of the making up of people, ‘The less the determinism, the 
more the possibilities for constraint’ (1991: 194). 
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1  Celia Lury would like to acknowledge the support of ESRC, ES/K010689/1, and Sophie Day would 
like to acknowledge the support of the NIHR Imperial BioMedical Research Centre.   
2 These are practices that Agamben associates with sovereignty: bare life, he argues, has always 
been the object and the aim of state action, and it has always been subjected to elaborate 
mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion.  
3 Arvidsson argues that it is through personalisation that platforms such as Facebook will – on their 
own and in conjunction with third parties – benefit from the financialization of everyday life 
(Arvidsson forthcoming). 
 
4One of the most famous examples of this group is item-to-item collaborative filtering, an algorithm 
developed by Amazon. 
5 He continues, ‘The collaborative filtering matrix intermeshes the identities of users and items. It is 
both possible and typical for a collaborative filter to take no special account of either, organizing all 
entities strictly in terms of ratings: users are known as a [ranked] collection of relations to items and 
items are known as a [ranked] collection of relations to users. Persons and things enjoy no separate 
modes of existence in the matrix, which is indeed a function for translating one into the other’ 
(2012). In other words, collaborative filtering algorithms do not just determine that ‘Users like you 
liked items like this’; they also establish that ‘Items like this liked users like you’. This ‘collaboration’ 
is very different from that of the taste-bearing individuals explored by Bourdieu in Distinction (1987) 
where the relations are those of class and the exercise of taste, and involve symbolic violence. How 
pathways of ‘a-typical individuation’ will coincide with, transform or supersede such ‘demographic’ 
stratification remains to be seen. 
6 For Stafford, analogy is an associative method, a demonstrative and evidentiary practice. She says, 
‘Analogy correlates originality with continuity, what comes after with what went before…This 
transport of predicates involves a mutual sharing in, or partaking of, certain determinable 
quantitative and qualitative attributes through a mediating image’ (2001: 9). 
7 Bateson describes set theory diagrams as ‘a topological approach to the logic of classification’ 
(1999: 186). In such diagrams a frame is a mode of referring by ordering. As Tkacz observes in a 
commentary on Bateson, ‘A frame always sorts things as either belonging or not belonging and this 
process is mediated by axioms or principles – indeed, the axioms are what define the frame; they are 
the conditions of its possibility’ (2014: 71).  
8 We see our understanding of the work of adjacency as an example of what Simondon describes as 
transduction, that is ‘a process — be it physical, biological, mental or social — in which an activity 
gradually sets itself in motion, propagating within a given domain, by basing this propagation on a 
structuration carried out in different zones of the domain: each region of the constituted structure 
serves as a constituting principle for the following one, so much so that a modification progressively 
extends itself at the same time as this structuring operation.’ He continues, ‘The transductive 
operation is an individuation in progress; it can physically occur most simply in the form of 
progressive iteration’ (Simondon 1992: 313). Totaro and Ninno (2014) argue that what is 
fundamental to the recursive function is that repetition becomes the aim of action. 
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9 Rabinow’s understanding of adjacency (2009) provides another, related set of terms. For Rabinow, 
the concept of adjacency is both analytic in that sets of relations must be decomposed and specified, 
and synthetic in that these relations must be recomposed and given new form. In this process, a 
neighbourhood emerges as the figure of what moves in tandem, together, the outcome of the 
interlinked processes of analysis and synthesis. 
10 Kauffman observes in relation to autonomous agents that ‘At the end of the cycle the system is 
poised to cycle again’ (2000: 68).   
11 The Optimizely platforms says that it can ‘Connect that browsing behavior, demographic 
information, contextual clues, and 1st- and 3rd-party data into a complete picture of your customer 
that you can use to power personalised experiences’. 
12 Hacking (1991) argues that ‘normalcy’ is one of the most socially significant statistical meta-
concepts. We are pointing to the significance of normalization without, we hope, imputing any 
consensus to the very different concepts and trajectories implicated in this meta-concept across a 
range of disciplines. 
13 Transitivity has a range of meanings in different disciplines. In linguistics, for example, transitivity 
is a property of verbs that relates to whether a verb can take direct objects and how many such 
objects a verb can take. In mathematics, a binary relation over a set is transitive if, whenever an 
element a is related to an element b, and b in turn is related to an element c, a is also related to c. 
The partial ordering produced by the algorithms discussed above organise liking in relations that are 
transitive in both senses.  
14 Parisi offers another view of the limits of reason, specifically in relation to computation. She 
suggests that while parametric quantities are discrete entities that not only select data, as part of 
the software into which they are scripted, they may also be infected by data that they are not able 
to compute: “Instead of being a continuous flow of data, such as a topological binding of many 
actualities into one stream of ceaseless variation, the incomputable … is an infinite series of discrete 
yet incomplete data that immanently ingresses and becomes uniquely arranged into algorithmic 
sets, in which these data acquire togetherness and continuity’ (2013: 170). 
15 In precision medicine (or its synonyms), reference is commonly made to the 4Ps which 
are predictive, personalised, preventive and participatory. Some of the advocates of this approach 
describe current developments as a revolution, ‘fueled by several factors: first, an appreciation that 
medicine is an information science; second, systems or holistic approaches to studying the 
enormous complexities of disease; third, emerging technologies that will let us explore new 
dimensions of patient data space; and fourth, powerful new analytical technologies—both 
mathematical and computational—that will let us decipher the billions of data points associated 
with each individual’ (Hood and Friend 2011). 
16 This is the strap-line employed by Skye, Rupert Murdoch’s telecommunications company, which 
encourages us all, no matter what, to ‘Believe in Better’. Elsewhere in the UK there is a chain of 
leisure centres that are called ‘Better’, a national insurance company that is called ‘More Than’ and 
Eurostar, the company that runs trains through the tunnel connecting the UK to continental Europe, 
deploys a campaign that employs the hashtag, ‘bettercloser’. There is a Canadian pharmaceutical 
company that has a range of products called Be.better; Nike’s current range of products includes a T-
shirt with the slogan ‘bettering’ written across the front; the shoe and clothing company Timberland 
use the advertising strap-line, ‘Best then. Better now’; the TSB (a UK bank) claims ‘Our TSB Classic 
Plus account, just got plusser’; the Wellcome Museum in London invites us in with the slogan ‘More 
than ever’; the i-Phone 6 is described as ‘bigger than bigger’; a recent advertisement for an electric 
car (an Audi) insists, ‘Like a car, but better’. 
17 It is hard to avoid drawing a parallel with Althusser’s discussion of interpellation: the policeman 
who calls out ‘Hey, you there’. Althusser’s approach draws on Lacan’s various discussions of the 
mirror stage, a form of pausing in which infants encounter an external sense of coherence, 
Page 38 of 39Theory Culture & Society
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
producing a sense of ‘I’ and ‘you’, that comes to represent a permanent structure of alienation for 
Lacan. 
18 A paradigmatic example is the recent successful filing of a patent by Amazon for a method of 
speculative or anticipatory shipping. See Coleman (forthcoming). 
19 In marketing and many policy fields, for example, the design of optimal pathways is informed by 
behavioural economics, in which doing is deployed as a measure of being. In the terms of our 
analysis, ‘nudging’ is the identification and operation of constraints that can manipulate constraints, 
and the current investment by business and government in a ‘context aware’ computational 
infrastructure seems designed to support the rise of personalisation as a mode of individuation that 
will afford the possibility of dynamic stratification. 
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